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PROGRAM MANAGER PREPARATION AND ACQUISITION 
OUTCOMES 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this project was to compare the program manager preparation of 
uniformed officers in United States Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, and then 
analyze acquisition outcomes. Entry-level requirements to become a program manager in 
the four branches were identified and similarities and differences were established. Cost 
and schedule performance datasets from 2017–2019 were analyzed using select 
acquisition reports managed by uniformed personnel. The Air Force ranked best in cost 
and schedule performance. Reviewing the preparational process of each branch and 
comparing cost and schedule performance over a three-year period identified a 
correlation between early exposure to acquisition and better outcomes in cost and 
schedule. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
According to retired General Colin Powell, “There is no secret to success. It is the 
result of preparation, hard work, and learning from failure” (BrainyQuote, n.d.). The 
Defense Acquisition System is no different. In an ever-evolving, fast-paced world, 
technologies are constantly changing, and the American warfighter deserves the best 
equipment to protect and defend the nation. However, the American taxpayers also deserve 
to have their hard-earned dollars spent effectively. There are many reported instances of 
failed programs that wasted time and money while providing zero capability for the 
warfighter. For instance, Rodriguez (2014) lists the “Top 10 Failed Defense Programs of 
the Revolution of Military Affairs Era” that cost American taxpayers $52.7B and provided 
zero capabilities for the warfighter. Articles pointing out failures in the acquisition system 
cause outrage among American taxpayers. 
Even though these programs failed to provide new capabilities to the warfighter, 
some may argue that the expense of such failed programs is worth their costs. For one, 
though these programs ultimately failed to directly provide increased capability to the 
warfighter, some argue that they often still increased knowledge and advanced 
technologies. Furthermore, some would point out that the costs of such programs spread 
out over several years represent a small proportion of the overall Department of Defense 
budget, which has been over $633B annually since 2008 (Macrotrends, n.d.). 
In the Defense Acquisition system, the program manager (PM) is the individual 
who must deliver the best for the warfighter while maintaining cost, schedule, and 
performance outcomes that maximize the taxpayer dollar. The PM is the sole individual 
responsible for running a military acquisition program from inception to disposal. 
Throughout a program’s life cycle, there are multiple PMs making decisions to ensure that 
superior capabilities are in the hands of the U.S. servicemen and women. To do this, a PM 
must prepare, work hard, and learn from failures.  
Each branch has its acquisition command and own way of preparing PMs. Does the 
difference in PM preparation result in better acquisition outcomes? Is one of the branches’ 
2 
PM preparations better than all of the rest? The goal of this research is to determine any 
differences in PM preparation between the United States Air Force, Army, Navy, and 
Marine Corps and how these impact cost and schedule outcomes. The hypothesis is that 
one branch has a different way to train PMs which produces superior results. This will be 
determined by comparing PM preparation and analyzing differences. This will be followed 
by examining acquisition statistics to determine if one branch outperforms the others in 
cost and schedule performance.  
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II. METHOD 
A. PREPARATIONAL PROCESS 
Each branch has its unique process of preparing PMs. Research of open source 
information provided the bulk of the data on preparational processes. Acquisition 
professionals from each branch provided additional clarifying information to ensure the 
accuracy of the preparational processes. Commonalities and differences in each branch’s 
PM preparational process were then identified and compared. 
B. ACQUISITION OUTCOMES 
Acquisition outcomes are measured by the triple constraint of program 
management. The triple constraint consists of performance, cost, and schedule. 
Performance entails that the acquired weapon system achieves the results required by the 
end-users. This is determined by performance specifications meeting and exceeding 
threshold objectives. Essentially, the end-user lists requirements, performance 
specifications are generated, and the degree to which the item meets or exceeds the 
specifications dictates the performance. However, in military acquisitions, the only true 
measure of performance is how the weapons system performs in combat. This makes 
capturing and analyzing performance data difficult, and no reports could be found. 
Therefore, the performance constraint was not able to be analyzed. 
The cost constraint views how well a program stays on budget. Each program uses 
cost estimation to establish a baseline budget for the program. A program executing 
funding under or on the baseline budget demonstrates how well it performs in the cost 
constraint. This study looks at the cost constraint performance in percentages. Positive 
numbers indicate a percentage cost growth; meanwhile, negative numbers show a program 
running under budget. The formula to calculate cost growth is (program cost-baseline 
cost)/(baseline cost). For instance, a $100M program that displays a 10 would be $10M 
over budget, whereas a -10 would be $10M under budget. The lower the number, the better 
a program performs against the cost constraint.  
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The schedule constraint outlines the timeline to complete events eventually leading 
to the fielding of equipment. The schedule sets a timeframe in which actions must be 
completed. Being on or ahead of schedule allows warfighters to receive the equipment they 
need on time. This study shows how well programs perform against their baseline schedule 
in percentages. Positive numbers indicate a percentage schedule growth or getting 
equipment to the warfighter later than projected. Meanwhile, negative numbers show 
capabilities being fielded faster than projected. The formula for calculating schedule 
growth remains the same as cost growth. The lower the number, the better a program 
performs against the schedule constraint. 
C. SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORT (SAR) 
To determine the services’ cost and schedule performance, SARs datasets were 
used. SARs are mandated under 10 U.S. Code 2432 to be submitted quarterly for major 
defense acquisition programs (MDAP) (Unit Cost Reports, 1983). Statutory law, 10 U.S. 
Code 2432 defines an MDAP as an “acquisition program that is not highly sensitive 
classified program (as determined by the Secretary of Defense) and that is designated by 
the Secretary of Defense as a major defense acquisition program” (Unit Cost Reports, 
1983). MDAPs are Acquisition Category (ACAT) I programs. Since 10 U.S. Code 2432 
was written, the dollar threshold has been adjusted for MDAPs. MDAP thresholds are 
currently programs that have an “eventual total expenditure for research, development, 
and test and evaluation of more than $525 million” or a total procurement cost of $3.065 
billion in fiscal year 2020 constant dollars (Department of Defense [DOD], 2020, 
Appendix 3A). Special interest programs as also designated as ACAT I (DOD, 2020).  
A SAR captures a myriad of data that is outlined in 10 U.S. Code 2432. Part of 
that data includes cost and schedule percentage growth (Unit Cost Reports, 1983). 
Defense Acquisition Management Informational Retrieval (DAMIR) combines SARs 
and provides multiple types of reports. One such report provides cost and schedule 
growth and can be easily filtered by branch. DAMIR reports from December 2017, 
2018, and 2019 captured SAR cost and schedule growth data for multiple programs. 
An additional report also provided the PMs from each SAR program. These reports are 
5 
Microsoft Excel documents and easily filtered. The SAR data was used from DAMIR 
reports to identify programs managed by uniformed personnel, filter programs by 
branch, and capture cost and schedule growth.  
D. GOAL 
To compare differences in the PM preparation between and branches and analyze 
their programs’ cost and schedule growth. If a measurable difference can be determined, a 
correlation can be made between PM preparation and acquisition outcomes. In order to do 
this, SAR datasets from December 2017, 2018, and 2019 were analyzed to see changes in 
cost and schedule over the three years. The data sets were filtered to eliminate programs 
supervised by civilians. Only programs oversaw by military service members were 
analyzed for this study, as the civilian preparation process could be different from the 
component in which they are serving.  
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III. PREPARATIONAL PROCESS 
A. HISTORY 
The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990, which 
was sponsored by former U.S. Representative Nicholas Mavroules, set preparational and 
experience requirements for acquisition professionals. DAWIA set the groundwork for 
ensuring an educated Defense Acquisition Corps. The act tasked the DOD with establishing 
training for military and civilian PMs, and with implementing the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) (Defense Acquisition Workforce Act [DAWIA], 1990). The DOD 
established the DAU and component functional leaders who are responsible to oversee 
certification standards and provide input for curriculums (Department of Defense [DOD] 
(2019). DAU curriculums were established for multiple acquisition career fields to include 
program management. Military Departments also must ensure that sufficient billets are 
available for junior officers to provide viable careers paths for advancement in the 
acquisition field (DOD, 2019).  
B. PROGRAM MANAGER PREPARATION REQUIREMENTS 
The DAWIA codified that to become an acquisition workforce member an 
individual must be the rank of O-4; major in the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps, or 
Lieutenant Commander in the Navy (DAWIA, 1990). However, the acquisition corps has 
been abolished (National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA], 2019). DAWIA also 
required the Secretary of Defense to established critical acquisition positions to be filled 
by O-4 or higher (DAWIA, 1990). PMs of MDAPs and significant non-MDAPS fill some 
of these critical acquisition positions.  
Working in conjunction with functional leaders from each component, the DAU 
established a curriculum for three different DAWIA certification levels for program 
management though the DAU does not certify an individual because they have completed 
the prerequisite course. Certification in each level depends upon the Component 
Acquisition Executive (Department of Defense [DOD], 2005). DAU PM level 
requirements can be satisfied through online classes or component instruction, but also 
8 
must include real-world experience. Table 1 shows the requirements for each DAWIA 
certification level for PMs. This includes the DAU-required classes, hours to complete the 
classes, and level of experience. However, as mentioned before DOD components can 
satisfy these requirements by their own methods. For instance, the Naval Postgraduate 
School Program Management curriculum meets the DAWIA level II certification.  
For DAWIA Program Management Level I, DAU requires the courses listed below 
with one year of acquisition experience with cost, schedule, and performance 
responsibilities (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], n.d.). Level II requires two years 
of the same responsibilities and additional classes (DAU, n.d.). The requirements for Level 
III certification build upon Level I and II, but experience drives the Level III certification. 
Level III involves four years in program management with cost, schedule, and performance 
responsibilities. At least 2 of the 4 years need to be in a program office for system 
development and acquisition or similar organization (DAU, n.d.). Table 1 identifies the 
basic qualifications to obtain DAWIA certification. Each military department can deviate 
for the DAU curriculum to fit their needs. 
9 
Table 1. DAU Level 1, 2, and 3 PM Training. Adapted from DAU (n.d.). 
 
 
In addition to the DAWIA certification levels, statutory requirements for 
experience are in place for PMs. PMs of MDAPs are required to have 8 years of acquisition 
experience (Defense Acquisition Workforce, 1990). Deputy PMs of MDAPS and PMs of 
significant non-MDAPs are required to have 6 years of acquisition experience (Defense 
Acquisition Workforce, 1990).. All three of the above mentioned PM positions are required 
to have at least 2 years of experience in a program office of similar organizations (Defense 
Acquisition Workforce, 1990). Deputy PMs of non-MDAPs are required to have 4 years 
of acquisition experience. (Defense Acquisition Workforce, 1990). 
There are multiple pathways to becoming a uniformed PM across the armed forces, 
as each branch is required to have acquisition-coded billets. These billets satisfy the DAU 
experience level requirements. This essentially leads to each PM having a different 
experience and pathway in becoming a PM. General pathways for each component are 
described below.  
Level 1
Required Courses Course Name Aproximate Hours to Completion Training Type
ACQ 1010 Fundamentals of Systems Acquisition Management 13 Online
ENG 101 Fundamentals of Systems Engineering 12 Online
CLB 007 Cost Analysis 4 Online
CLV 016 Introduction to Earned Value Management 1 Online
Total Hours 30 Online
1 year of acquisition experience with cost, schedule, and performance responsibilities
Level 2
ACQ 202 ACQ 202  Intermediate Systems Acquisition, Part A 19 Online
ACQ 203 Intermediate Systems Acquisition, Part B (R 4 days Instructor led
PMT 2520 Program Management Tools Course, Part I 15 Online
PMT257V Program Management Tools Course, Part II 5 days Instructor led
CON 121 Contract Planning 11 Online
CON 124 Contract Execution 9 Online
CON 127 Contract Management 8 Online
EVM 101 Fundamentals of Earned Value Management 10 Online
ISA 1011 Basic Information Systems Acquisition 10 Online
Total Hours 9 class day and 82 hours online
2 years of acquisition experience with cost, schedule, and performance responsibilities
Level 3
ACQ 315 Understanding Industry (R) 4.5 days Instructor led
BCF 110 Fundamentals of Business Financial Management 22 Online
ENG 201 Applied Systems Engineering in Defense Acquisition, Part I 9 Online
EVM 263 Principles of Schedule Management ® 3 days Instructor led
LOG 104 Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) 6 Online
PMT 3550 Program Management Office Course, Part A 13 Online
PMT 360 Program Management Office Course, Part B (R) 18.5 days Instructor led
Total Hours 26 days and 50 hours
Overall Total 35 days in class 162 hours online
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C. PROGRAM MANAGER PREPARATION REQUIREMENTS BY 
BRANCH 
1. The United States Air Force  
The Air Force provides a few different pathways to become a PM. Acquisition 
officers can come from the Air Force Academy or ROTC. Acquisitions will be the 
lieutenant’s primary military occupational specialty. After a three-week course in 
acquisition fundamentals, lieutenants can go straight into acquisitions. Some choose to take 
an operational tour first and then come back to acquisitions; meanwhile, others embed with 
industry to learn program management and then return to acquisitions. The Air Force is the 
only branch that provides rotational assignments (Sullivan, 2018). Rotational assignments 
was identified as a leading practice in the development of PMs (Sullivan, 2018).  
2. United States Army 
All acquisition positions are documented in the Army’s Military Acquisition 
Position List (MAPL). Officers must serve in a billet listed on the MAPL to become a PM. 
Once placed into an acquisition position, the officer has a 24-month grace period to earn 
their DAU Level II certification.  
An officer can complete the DAU training for program management though most 
active-duty officers attend the Army Acquisition Center of Excellence (AACOE) for their 
Level I & II certifications in program management or contracting. AACOE conveys DAU 
equivalencies. To obtain Level III certification the officer must attend DAU classes to 
complete their certification. 
To be eligible to become a PM “only major or above who meet the following 
requirements may be considered for Acquisition Corps membership: 24 semesters of 
business credit; at least 4 years of experience in an acquisition position; and DAWIA Level 
II certification in at least one area of concentration” United States Army Acquisition 
Support Center, n.d., para. 7).  
A business degree is not required as any baccalaureate degree is acceptable. 
However, officers with science, technology, engineering, and mathematics degrees are 
more highly sought after today followed by those with business degrees. To get the 
11 
requisite four years of experience, the officer must have a job assigned on the MAPL 
though a business type degree can count as one of the four required years.  
All officers will have a master’s degree before entering the Acquisition Corps or 
will attend one of two schools offering an advanced degree in acquisition-specific training. 
The two schools are the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and the 
University of Alabama in Huntsville. The Army has a relatively new 18-month program 
partnering with the University of Alabama in Huntsville and DAU, whereby an officer can 
gain a master of science degree with a concentration in systems engineering. The effort of 
the two schools is to convey Level III training upfront when the officer starts their 
acquisition careers. However, the Level II requirement is for acquisition corps 
membership. 
3. United States Navy and Marine Corps  
As part of their PM preparation, Navy and Marine Corps officer must have a billet 
that is acquisition coded. Once in a coded billet, the officer must achieve DAU Level II 
certification. The Navy offers acquisition corps master’s degree programs for both Navy 
and Marine Corps officers, but those are not required to become a PM. An officer only 
needs to be an O-4 or higher and complete an acquisition coded billet and DAU Level II 
certification.  
D. COMMONALITIES  
DAWIA required that the DOD set up the DAU. DAU established requirements for 
certification levels which include real-world experience. Each component acquisition 
executive certifies the PMs. On paper, the preparation to become a PM in each component 
appears the same.  
E. DIFFERENCES  
The Air Force prepares PMs in two ways that are different to the other branches. 
First, the Air Force assigns officers to rotational assignments in acquisition billets. Second, 
commissioned officers can go directly into acquisitions. Additionally, the Army has the 
requirement that a PM must have a master’s degree, and it provides an opportunity for 
12 
acquisition degrees from NPS or the University of Alabama in Huntsville. Finally, each 
acquisition coded billet provides a different experience for each PM. 
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IV. ACQUISITION OUTCOMES 
A. RESULTS 
The DAMIR reports were filtered to ensure that PMs from the studied programs 
were uniformed officers. The reports were sorted by components and the percentage of cost 
and schedule growth for 2017–2019 was captured. The DAMIR reports listed 22 Air Force, 
13 Army, 6 Marine Corps, and 28 Navy ACAT I programs. Table 2 shows the cost and 
schedule growth of these programs. Table 3 shows a ranking system displaying the 
branches’ performance with an average score. The results show that the Air Force out 
performed all services  
Table 2. Service Cost and Schedule Performance 2017–2019. Adapted from 
SARS (2021) 
 
(Cont’d on next page) 
 
Component Program Cost 17 Schedule 17 Cost 18 Schedule 18 Cost 19 Schedule 19
AIR FORCE AEHF -22.86 -- -23.57 -- -24.24 --
AIR FORCE APT -- -- 0.27 0.00 0.23 -17.65
AIR FORCE B-2 DMS-M 3.06 8.70 13.69 8.70 -5.96 47.83
AIR FORCE B61 Mod 12 LEP TKA -14.99 -- -1.03 -- -5.53 --
AIR FORCE EPS -- -- -2.69 --
AIR FORCE F-15 EPAWSS -40.41 1.47 -35.13 -- 0.00 --
AIR FORCE F-22 Inc 3.2B Mod -0.17 1.39 -3.44 1.39 -3.55 2.78
AIR FORCE FAB-T-CAPT 2.89 -- -4.06 -- 3.85 --
AIR FORCE FAB-T-FAT-T FET -5.08 -- -4.14 --
AIR FORCE GPS III -4.24 -- -7.71 -- -7.83 --
AIR FORCE GPS IIIF 0.00 -- -0.67 --
AIR FORCE HC/MC-130 Recap -6.62 -- -7.46 -- -10.54 --
AIR FORCE ICBM Fuze Mod 0.61 0.00 -0.76 0.00 6.28 13.45
AIR FORCE JASSM 0.74 -- 0.00 0.00 117.83 --
AIR FORCE KC-46A -1.22 23.08 0.00 0.00 -0.86 51.28
AIR FORCE MGUE Inc 1 -6.51 -- -5.53 -- -8.54 --
AIR FORCE NSSL -17.46 0.00 -11.53 0.00 -9.11 0.00
AIR FORCE PNVC Integrator -- -- -- -- -- --
AIR FORCE SBIRS High -10.78 -- -14.37 -- -15.81 --
AIR FORCE SDB II 4.15 41.67 4.75 51.39 4.88 58.33
AIR FORCE VC-25B -- -- -2.33 -- -1.95 --
AIR FORCE WGS -- -- 19.13 4.26 19.12 4.26
Average -7.43 10.90 -4.16 7.30 2.74 20.04
Component Program Cost 17 Schedule 17 Cost 18 Schedule 18 Cost 19 Schedule 19
ARMY AH-64E New Build -23.34 -- -6.18 -- -3.51 --
ARMY AH-64E Remanufacture 6.98 6.02 7.54 6.02 6.41 6.02
ARMY CH-47F Block II -0.58 0.00 19.13 87.50 -0.58 0.00
ARMY CIRCM -0.35 2.82 0.11 2.82 0.00 2.82
ARMY GMLRS/GMLRS AW 148.17 -4.30 132.29 -4.30 88.81 -4.30
ARMY HMS 13.00 188.24 15.00 188.24 19.79 188.24
ARMY IAMD 22.85 85.00 21.46 85.00 25.16 85.00
ARMY ITEP -- -- -0.01 0.00
ARMY JAGM -2.72 15.79 0.00 0.00 -4.74 15.79
ARMY MQ-1C Gray Eagle -4.70 6.98 -0.92 6.98 -2.76 6.98
ARMY PAC-3 MSE 35.71 -- 0.25 -- -1.44 --
ARMY PIM 1.93 -- 26.88 -- 30.32 --
ARMY UH-60M Black Hawk -2.30 -- -0.96 -- -1.15 --
Average 16.22 37.57 17.88 46.53 12.02 33.39
14 
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Table 3. Component Cost and Schedule Performance Averages and 
Rankings 
 
 
B. ANALYSIS  
Each component’s averages were calculated using the information from the 
December 2017, 2018, and 2019 DAMIR reports for cost and schedule growth. A negative 
number in cost growth shows that a program is staying under budget. Meanwhile, a positive 
number in cost growth shows that a program is over budget. The same is true for schedule 
growth. A positive number indicates a program is behind schedule, and a negative number 
that a program is ahead of schedule. 
Component Program Cost 17 Schedule 17 Cost 18 Schedule 18 Cost 19 Schedule 19
MARINE CORPS ACV FoV -6.98 0.00 -0.41 0.00 147.88 1.75
MARINE CORPS CH-53K -0.22 41.18 0.95 58.82 0.48 58.82
MARINE CORPS DDG 1000 7.65 37.60 7.90 52.00 10.80 52.00
MARINE CORPS H-1 Upgrades -3.54 2.90 -2.02 2.90 -3.61 2.90
MARINE CORPS V-22 5.61 1.20 -1.57 1.20 -1.59 1.20
MARINE CORPS VH-92A -4.37 -1.32 -4.83 1.32 0.20 6.58
Average -0.31 13.59 0.00 19.37 25.70 20.54
Component Program Cost 17 Schedule 17 Cost 18 Schedule 18 Cost 19 Schedule 19
NAVY AAG 0.13 0.00 7.31 0.00 -11.76 -0.98
NAVY AARGM-ER 0.00 0.00 -2.18 0.00
NAVY AGM-88E AARGM -0.26 28.24 0.11 28.24 0.00 28.24
NAVY AIM-9X Blk II -5.30 -- 0.74 -- -2.93 --
NAVY AMDR -5.45 2.46 -1.45 7.38 0.87 6.56
NAVY BMDS -- -- -- -- -- --
NAVY CEC 2.72 0.00 -0.09 0.00 2.35 0.00
NAVY CVN 78 57.36 31.39 51.36 35.77 -3.18 51.09
NAVY DDG 51 9.55 34.15 13.96 34.15 12.03 34.15
NAVY E-2D AHE 2.56 -0.73 -0.37 -0.73 1.52 -0.73
NAVY IDECM -34.57 -- -4.27 -- -2.92 --
NAVY IRST -0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.35 0.00
NAVY JPALS -0.28 0.00 -6.61 0.00 -0.74 3.92
NAVY KC-130J 0.14 -- 11.60 -- -0.55 --
NAVY LCS -43.31 8.57 -39.35 8.57 -40.14 8.57
NAVY LCS MM -13.02 25.00 -0.13 -- 1.66 --
NAVY LPD 17 -0.55 10.94 -0.16 10.94 -0.72 10.94
NAVY MIDS 4.55 -- 8.44 -- 11.10 --
NAVY MQ-25 -- -- -14.45 0.00 -10.77 0.00
NAVY MQ-4C Triton -0.59 67.39 2.54 69.57 8.48 86.96
NAVY MQ-8 Fire Scout 2.58 -- 9.14 -- 8.04 --
NAVY NGJ Mid-Band 4.69 16.67 1.38 16.67 -0.74 16.67
NAVY OASuW Inc 1 (LRASM) 19.50 -- -8.45 -- 13.18 --
NAVY P-8A 2.58 3.64 2.80 3.64 4.28 3.64
NAVY SM-6 -16.96 50.67 9.21 50.67 5.58 50.67
NAVY SSBN 826 -1.06 3.73 -1.13 3.73 -0.49 3.73
NAVY SSN 774 -1.23 6.45 -2.85 6.45 -0.45 6.45
NAVY Trident II Missile 0.12 4.05 0.81 4.05 1.16 4.05
Average -0.67 15.40 1.48 13.96 -0.36 15.70
Component % Cost Growth 2017 % Schedule Growth 2017 % Cost Growth 2018 % Schedule Growth 2018 % Cost Growth 2019 % Schedule Growth 2019 Average Score Rankings
AIR FORCE -7.43 10.90 -4.16 7.30 2.74 20.04 1.33 1
ARMY 16.22 37.57 17.88 46.53 12.02 33.39 3.83 2
MARINE CORPS -0.31 13.59 0.00 19.37 25.70 20.54 2.83 3
NAVY -0.67 15.40 1.48 13.96 -0.36 15.70 2 4
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Each branch of service was analyzed by the cost and schedule growth of their 
programs. The percentage cost and schedule growth of each program was averaged to get 
an aggregate total for years 2017–2019 by service components. For instance, the Marine 
Corps has six SARs for 2017–2019. To calculate the average total for cost growth in 2017, 
each program percentage was added up and divided by six, which was -.31. This means 
that the Marine Corps experienced a cost growth from the baseline estimates of all six 
programs by -.31 percent. This demonstrates that the Marine Corps stayed just under 
budget for 2017. Consequently, in 2019 the Marine Corps’ average cost growth was 25.70. 
This demonstrates a cost growth of 25.70 percent over the baseline budgets of the six 
programs.  
The branches were then compared to each other for analysis. For example, the 
schedule percentage growth average for the components in 2017 was: Air Force 10.90%, 
the Army 37. %, Marine Corps 13.59%, and Navy 15.40%. In this example, the Air Force 
had the lowest average schedule growth ranking them at number one in this category. 
Meanwhile, the Marine Corps was second, Navy third, and Army fourth. Each service 
received a score corresponding to their ranking. The lowest score received a one and the 
highest score receiving a four. The scores for 2017–2019 were averaged to show which 
branch performed the best in cost and schedule growth. The Air Force was ranked first in 
four categories and second in two. Out of the six categories the Air Force received eight 
points, which divided by six gave them the best average at 1.33. The Navy averaged a 2.0 
ranking them second, followed by the Marine Corps at 2.83, and finally the Army at 3.83. 
According to the results, the Air Force outperformed the other branches in cost and 
schedule growth or 2017–2019.  
C. CORRELATION BETWEEN PREPARATION AND ACQUISITION 
OUTCOMES  
Every branch of service has the same requirement to become a PM due to DAWIA. 
Those requirements are DAU-required classes or equivalency certified by the Component 
Acquisition Executive (DOD Directive 5000.52), and years of experience required for each 
level. The main difference in the services PM preparation revolves around DAU 
equivalencies and how experience is gained. The Army requires PMs to have a master’s 
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degree, and the Navy offers acquisition degrees at the Naval Postgraduate School. The Air 
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps do not require advanced degrees to become PMs. The Air 
Force allows its officers to go directly into acquisitions and provides rotational assignments 
to bolster their experience, which is the main difference between Air Force PM preparation 
and the other services. Thus, the main factor in this study is that the experience gained in 
the Air Force’s preparational process seems to correlate to better acquisition outcomes. The 
best method to prepare PMs for success encompasses early exposure and rotational 
assignment in acquisitions.  
D. LIMITATIONS  
Admittedly there are weaknesses in this study. One consideration is the number of 
programs for each component. More programs to divide by could have led to have skewed 
the results. For instance, in the sample there were 28 Navy programs and only 6 Marine 
programs. More Navy programs could have had higher cost growth than Marine programs, 
but the average cost growth would be less due to being divided by 28 vice 6. However, the 
same would apply to programs running under budget. The sure number of programs could 
have skewed the data in favor of one service. Though this limitation had a negligible effect 
for this dataset.  
The accuracy or non-reporting of cost and schedule growth, as signified by the 
blanks in Table 2, could have skewed scores. In those cases, it is difficult to conclude 
whether the program did not experience a change due to good management, were too early 
in the development so that no baseline had been established to compare against, or another 
reason. Another drawback to the dataset was the ability to ascertain if program cost and 
schedule growth was due to an increase in quantity changes. According to the DOD 
(Department of Defense [DOD], 2019) quantity and scope changes account for cost 
increases however, with revised indices 16 of 20 programs are equal to or under their 
current baseline costs. Additionally, 60 of 84 SARs reporting captured the same (DOD, 
2019). The changes during program life cycles could affect the accuracy of the averages. 
Though according to the report on SARs for 2018, quantity changes were captured in 
revised indices and resulted in a majority of programs being on or under their baselines. 
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Again, this limitation could have impacted averages, but seems to have little effect on the 
dataset.  
Another argument that can be made is that the some branches may have better cost 
and schedule estimators, which enables them to perform better in cost and schedule, and is 
not indicative of a PMs ability. However, it is still the responsibility of the program 
management office led by the PM to submit the cost analysis requirement description to 
the program executive office for approval (Department of Defense [DOD], 2015). This 
means that the PM has the ultimate responsibility of providing cost estimates.  
Finally, the most significant limitation in determining how well the branches 
perform in cost and schedule involves ACAT categories. The SARs reported in the chart 
are ACAT I programs. The RAND Corporation identified “that about 92 percent of all 
programs are non-MDAPs not subject to centralized OSD oversight or existing Nunn-
McCurdy reporting and control requirements” (Arena et al., 2013). These programs are 
managed by each military department and they have their monitoring systems (Arena et 
al., 2013). If the programs not subject to OSD oversite were all reported, the results of this 
study may have been different.  
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V. RECOMMENDATION 
A. UNIFORM STANDARDS 
It is clear from the study, that there is no uniform process in which to become a PM 
in the military. The United States Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy all have 
similar pathways to becoming a PM. Those similar preparational paths are the results of 
DAWIA and DAU certification levels. The DAU has an established curriculum. However, 
there are DAU equivalences established by each component. Since each component can 
have equivalencies outside of the DAU courses, there is really no way to guarantee uniform 
educational standards.  
A former PM argues for the professionalization of the acquisition workforce by the 
use of accredited education such as that provided by the Project Management Institute 
(PMI) (Mortlock, 2020). He contends that PMI has three certification levels and that each 
level fits into the DAWIA PM levels (Mortlock, 2020). This is a compelling argument to 
the need of a more standardized process of developing PMs. The private sector holds PMI 
certifications in high esteem. The American National Standards Institute certified PMI’s 
practices as an American National Standard in (Holtzman, 1999). However, it has been 
identified that the PMI certifications would likely not meet the complexities of managing 
DOD programs (Karnes, (2021). For instance, the Project Management Professional (PMP) 
exam outline lists three domains: people, process, and the business environment with a 
total of 35 tasks (Project Management Institute, 2020). The questions on the exam 
breakdown into the following percentages and tasks: 42% people covering 14 tasks, 50% 
process contributing to 17 tasks, and 8% business environment with 4 tasks. Meanwhile, 
the DOD program management competencies number 70. The competencies are listed in 
Table 4 
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Table 4. Program Management Competency Units and Competencies. 
Source: MacStravic (2016). 
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It is clear from the competencies listed in Table 4 that PMI certifications will not 
meet the preparational requirements of DOD PMs. It would be very difficult for a 
commercial standard to meet the unique needs of the DOD. However, PMI or another 
commercial certification could be used as a supplement to DOD PM preparation. The DOD 
should establish a uniform curriculum to prepare PMs. One such curriculum is in place and 
available through the Naval Postgraduate School Masters of Science in Program 
Management. DOD components could send PMs through this curriculum or establish their 
own curriculums based upon the Naval Postgraduate School’s Program Management 
model. This would create a uniform standard across the branches that meets the unique 
educational requirements of DOD PMs.  
B. EXPERIENCE 
Experience is a huge factor in developing in any profession. Teachers are required 
to complete student teaching before becoming full time educators. Doctors complete 
residency before practicing medicine on their own. Also, many trades require apprentices 
before an individual can become a certified professional. DOD acquisition professionals 
are no different. In order to be a member of the original acquisition corps, a uniformed 
service member had to be an O-4 (DAWIA, 1990). This means a military member served 
around 8 years before being eligible to become and acquisition corps member. Recently 
the acquisition corps was terminated via public law that is to take effect in December 2021 
(NDAA, 2019). This could be a step in the right direction as it may allow for junior military 
personnel to enter the acquisition community earlier and gain more experience. The 
experience requirement to be PMs of MDAPs still remain in statutory law, but allowing 
perspective PMs to gain acquisition experience earlier could led to better program 
management of DOD programs.  
In addition to early exposure to acquisition billets, the branches need to establish a 
primary military occupational specialty MOS for military officers. The Air Force is the 
only branch in this study that allows officers to start off in an acquisition military 
occupational specialty. In addition to direct entry into acquisition, the Air Force provides 
cross-flow experience in which an officer leaves their primary MOS to serve in a different 
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community (Horine, 2011). One officer who started off as an Acquisition Manager went 
into Intelligence for a few years before returning to acquisitions. Through this experience, 
he was able to get closer to the end user, understand their needs, and acquire systems that 
better fit the desired capabilities of the warfighter (Horine, 2011). This make more sense 
than having officers enter into acquisition fields later in their careers and then still having 
to demonstrate primary MOS credibility by returning to billets in their MOS to remain 
competitive for promotion.  
C. CONCLUSION  
Experiences seems to be the biggest factor in program management preparation that 
impacts cost and schedule performance. This can be correlated to the fact the Air Force 
provides officers early entrance into the acquisition field and rotates them through billets. 
The Air Force performed the best out of all the branches in this study. Meanwhile, the 
Army is the only branch that requires PMs to have master’s degrees, yet the Army 
performed the worst in cost and schedule over the period from 2017–2019. However, this 
study does have limitations as over 90 percent of active programs are non-MDAP and not 
reportable on SARs. Looking into the cost and schedule performance of those programs 
would provide further insight into how to prepare PMs.  
A recommendation for DOD components to consider would be to open up 
acquisition positions to junior military officers. This recommendation is backed by an OSD 
study of PMs in which a need was identified for early and more aggressive career 
experience, with their recommendation to designate military officers into acquisition 
earlier (DOD Study of Program Manager Training and Experience, August 21, 2014). 
Embedding junior officers in deployable units who liaison directly with program 
management offices would give the junior officers the perspective of the warfighter and 
their needs. After experiencing time in a deployable unit, the junior officer could then rotate 
through billets in the program offices to gain experience or embed with industry. This type 
of preparation is similar to the Air Force’s existing cross-flow program and should be 
adopted by the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. The valuable experienced gleaned would 
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provide better program management of defense acquisition programs in the future by 
safeguarding taxpayer dollars and acquiring needed capabilities for the warfighter.  
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